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1 Introduction
The economic analysis of crime gives clear advice on how to achieve compliance with the
law: it requires the detection and punishment of law violations to deter non-compliance
(Becker, 1968). Ever since Becker’s seminal work, the deterrence hypothesis has been
subject to controversy. On one hand, scepticism is fueled by the difficulties in identifying
deterrence. Despite substantial advances of the empirical literature (for a survey, see
Levitt and Miles, 2007), there are only a few studies that solve the identification problem
(e.g., Corman and Mocan, 2000; DiTella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Drago et al., 2009; Draca
et al., 2010; Machin and Marie, 2010). On the other hand, it has been argued that formal
law enforcement explains only little of the variation in compliance (e.g., Dills et al., 2009)
and that informal institutions, like social norms, might play a more important role in
shaping adherence to the law.1 The question then arises whether enforcement strategies
should only be based on the deterrent threat from formal sanctions or whether one can
also draw upon different behavioral motives.
The present paper offers novel insights on this question by testing alternative enforce-
ment strategies in a large-scale natural field experiment. In our setup, people are required
by law to pay an annual fee for receiving public broadcasting. An enforcement problem
exists because public broadcasting channels can be received without paying the fee. Those
who deviate from the law face a non-negligible detection risk and the threat of sizeable
fines. The enforcement authority granted us access to a unique sample of more than
50,000 individuals who were identified as potential evaders. In cooperation with the au-
thority, we sent mailings to 95 percent of this sample. In addition, a 5 percent randomly
selected subsample did not receive mailings. Mailing recipients were randomly assigned
to treatment conditions that differed in the wording of the cover letter. Using the au-
thority’s standard letter as baseline, we varied the text along three dimensions: the letter
may contain a legal threat, stressing a high detection risk and possible legal and financial
sanctions, a moral appeal, emphasizing that compliance is a matter of fairness, and social
information, highlighting the overall level of compliance. The different treatments were
evaluated by comparing the mailing response to that in the baseline treatment and the
1See, among many others, Kahan (1997); Posner (2000); McAdams and Rasmusen (2007) and the conference
volumes on Social Norms, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Law (Journal of Legal Studies 27(3),
1998) as well as on The Legal Construction of Norms (Virginia Law Review 86(8), 2000).
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behavior in the no-mailing group. Our main focus is on the number of evaders who cease
to deviate from the law and begin paying the fee.
The setup of the experiment allows us to overcome the identification problem that
plagues the law enforcement literature. First, and most importantly, the random treat-
ment assignment assures that the tested strategies are truly exogenous. Second, our key
dependent variable – whether or not an evader starts to pay the fee – allows for a clean
measurement of treatment effects on compliance behavior. In particular, there is no scope
for behavioral responses beyond compliance to affect this variable.2 Finally, the measure-
ment of our dependent variable is independent of the experimental conditions. To ensure
this property, the treatments did not intervene with the effectively implemented enforce-
ment level: the legal threat just stresses elements of the current enforcement practice, but
the objective sanction risk remains constant over all treatments. There are at least two
reasons for why a change in actual enforcement could affect measured response. First, the
number of individuals who start paying the fee is mechanically linked to the number of
detections from field enforcement. Similar to an increase in the level of police, one would
have to disentangle a deterrence effect from the mere impact on the measured offense
rate (Levitt, 1998). Second, as shown by Rincke and Traxler (2010), the enforcement of
license fees through field inspections causes systematic spillovers on undetected cheaters.
These spillovers would blur the measured treatment response to the legal threat. Our
procedures exclude such concerns by design.
As we keep actual enforcement unchanged, any observed response to the threat (as
well as to the other mailing treatments) must necessarily be driven by changes in the
mailing recipients’ subjective perceptions, e.g., regarding the detection risk. Clearly,
the treatments may affect various perception domains. To account for this point, we
conducted a follow-up survey which exposed participants from a different sample to the
letters used in the field experiment. In this vein, we elicited the treatments’ impact on
different perception domains.
2The importance of this issue is widely acknowledged in the enforcement literature. For instance, research
that employs crime or offense rates as the dependent variable has to account for the fact that these rates can be
affected by incapacitation (Levitt, 1998) and displacement effects (e.g., the spatial displacement of offenders in
response to a local increase in law enforcement; see Jacob et al., 2007). Equivalently, tax enforcement research
that uses reported income as a response variable recognizes the difficulties in interpreting this indirect measure
of evasion (Slemrod et al., 2001).
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The paper provides two sets of results. The first concerns the effectiveness of deter-
rence. First of all, we find a striking impact of the mailings. In the no-mailing condition,
the fraction of individuals who start to comply with the law within 50 days of the exper-
iment is very low (0.8 percent). Sending mailings increases this fraction to 7.7 percent.
Hence, there are nearly ten times more cheaters who start to pay license fees in the mailing
conditions. This corresponds to a net-revenue per mailing of e 15 and, with 100,000 an-
nual mailings, to e 1.5 million of additional revenues per year. While the effect could also
be attributed to a decline in transaction costs, our survey indicates that the mailings trig-
ger a strong alert effect: receiving a mailing causes a substantial increase in the perceived
detection risk. The mailings signal surveillance and thus – jointly with a transaction cost
effect – create a pronounced effect on compliance.
The comparison across the different mailing treatments identifies a strong deterrent ef-
fect of the legal threat. The threat increases the share of individuals who start complying
by an additional percentage point. Compared to the baseline mailing, this effect corre-
sponds to a 15 percent increase in compliance. The survey reveals that the treatments’
impact on behavior can be traced back to an increase in the perceived costs of non-
compliance. Our evidence therefore documents that the legal threat shapes perceptions
and that individuals rationally adjust their compliance behavior to these perceptions. By
exploiting information on different types of mailing respondents we find further support
for this conclusion. While the legal threat has a strong effect on evaders who face poten-
tially severe sanctions in case of detection, it has no effect on types who are not exposed
to an actual sanction risk. In summary, this first set of results lends strong support
to the role of economic incentives for compliance. In our experiment, deterrent threats
unambiguously work as enforcement strategies.
Our second set of results clarifies whether compliance can be enforced by moral suasion
or by providing social information – i.e., without resorting to legal threats. The moral
framing, which appeals to the fairness aspect of compliance, calls upon people’s conscience
and aims at making a specific moral concept more salient. Social psychology research
suggests that the framing should increase compliance if the value judgment is shared
by the recipients (Cialdini, 1998). In contrast to this conjecture, but in line with other
studies in economics (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Wenzel and Taylor, 2004), we do not find
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an effect of the appeal. It is important to note, however, that our mailings are targeted to
a specific sample of those who deviate from the law. Hence, the null-result does not imply
that moral standards are irrelevant for the compliance of the overall population. As those
who violate the law often develop anti-social norms (Meares et al., 2004), individuals in
our sample might be more likely to disagree with the moral statement in the letter. In line
with this interpretation, we observe that the appeal has a negative effect on compliance
in several subsamples of the study. Our experiment therefore suggests that moral appeals
are not an attractive policy to enforce compliance among those who purposely deviate
from the law.
Legal scholars emphasize that compliance is also driven by “the informal enforcement
of social mores by acquaintances, bystanders, trading partners, and others” (Ellickson,
1998, p. 540) – a view that is also reflected in economic research documenting the
importance of informal sanctions (see, e.g., Falk et al., 2005). Norm-enforcing sanctions
are thereby considered to be stronger the more people follow a norm (Elster, 1989).
The social information treatment, which communicates the actual compliance rate of 94
percent, may thus shape perceptions regarding the strength of informal law enforcement.
Equivalently, the ‘broken windows theory’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) suggests that the
provided information may change perceptions about formal law enforcement.3 Therefore,
by altering perceptions about both formal and informal sanctions, the social information
can affect compliance behavior.
In our experiment, we do not observe a significant effect of the information treatment.
Consistent with the theoretical considerations, however, we find that imparting social
information has significantly different effects in municipalities where evasion is believed to
be common compared to municipalities where evasion is believed to be rare. In the former,
the treatment has a positive, in the latter a weakly negative effect on compliance. This
outcome complements existing evidence on social interaction effects in non-compliance
(e.g., Glaeser et al., 1996; Galbiati and Zanella, 2008). Moreover, it relates to the literature
on conditional cooperation in the private provison of public goods (Frey and Meier, 2004;
Shang and Croson, 2009; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2009). Our study delivers a first
piece of evidence on policies that build upon conditional compliance with the law – i.e.,
3For recent contributions on the broken windows effect, see Corman and Mocan (2005), Harcourt and Ludwig
(2006), Keizer et al. (2008).
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individuals conditioning their compliance on the (perceived) compliance of others. At the
same time, our results demonstrate the limits of applying belief management – i.e., policy
interventions that aim at affecting subjective beliefs – as an enforcement tool.4 With
non-common priors, one piece of information can trigger opposing behavioral responses.
Hence, even with conditional compliance with the law, belief management might fail to
increase aggregate compliance.
Our results contribute to several strands of the literature. First and most importantly,
we provide compelling evidence for the deterrence hypotheses from a controlled field ex-
periment. Second, we offer novel results on the effectiveness of alternative enforcement
strategies within a given institutional framework. Our data thus allow for a direct com-
parison of classical and ‘behavioral’ approaches to law enforcement and identify several
impediments for strategies that go ‘beyond punishment’ (Frey, 2009). Finally, linking
the results from the experiment to our perception survey, we not only evaluate the effec-
tiveness of different enforcement strategies but also contribute to an understanding of the
causal links between policies, subjective perceptions, and behavior (Nagin, 1998; Lochner,
2007; Hjalmarsson, 2009).
In terms of methodology, the paper is closely related to field experiments in the domain
of tax enforcement.5 The most prominent is the Minnesota Income Tax Compliance
Experiment, where the Internal Revenue Service approached taxpayers with different
mailing types (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod et al., 2001). A treatment similar to our
legal threat studied the effects of communicating a high audit probability. The results
were mixed. While low and middle-income taxpayers responded with a modest increase in
reported income, the audit threat lead to lower reported tax liabilities from high income
taxpayers (Slemrod et al., 2001). Appealing to taxpayers’ conscience did not show any
significant effects (Blumenthal et al., 2001).6 In an experiment with the Australian tax
authorities, Wenzel and Taylor (2004) studied a number of interventions on taxpayers’
property tax deductions. A deterrent letter did not have a significant effect in their study.
More recently, Kleven et al. (2010) ran a large-scale experiment in collaboration with the
4For a general discussion of belief management in social interactions, see Fehr and Falk (2002).
5For an overview of randomized experiments in the criminology literature, see the meta-study by Farrington
and Welsh (2006).
6In a similar setup, Schwartz and Orleans (1967) found that normative appeals were slightly more effective
than sanction threats. In a replication of the study, McGraw and Scholz (1991) neither found an effect of threats
nor of appeals. The power of both contributions is, however, limited due to small sample sizes.
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Danish Inland Revenue. While they find that individuals update their declared income in
response to audit threats, they also observe that many taxpayers reported lower taxable
incomes (similar to Slemrod et al.).
One crucial aspect that distinguishes our study from all these important contributions
concerns the measurement of the treatment response. Tax enforcement experiments typ-
ically rely on the evaluation of differences in reported income before and after a specific
manipulation. The immense heterogeneity among taxpayers (in terms of their characteris-
tics and the availability of different tax-minimizing strategies) complicates this comparison
and gives rise to different ways of interpreting any finding. In contrast, we evaluate our
treatments based on a straightforward indicator variable – whether or not an evader starts
to comply with the law. In addition, the set of possible responses to our treatments is
well-defined and leaves little scope for the interpretation of our results. Finally, none
of the mentioned studies addresses the role of perceptions for the link between policy
manipulations and behavioral responses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the
institutional background and the design of the field experiment. In section 4, we discuss
several hypotheses regarding the impact of our treatments. The results are analyzed in
section 5. Section 6 studies complementary evidence on perceptions from a survey. The
paper concludes with a discussion of our findings.
2 Institutional Background
A significant share of radio and television broadcasting around the world – the US being a
notable exemption – is provided by public broadcasters that are mainly financed through
TV and radio license fees : two thirds of all European, one half of African and Asian,
and about 10 percent of countries in the Americas employ license fees. In Europe, the
total amount of fees collected added up to roughly e 20 billion in 2005.7 A typical license
fee system is in place in Austria. According to the Austrian Broadcasting License Fee
Act, households must file a registration and pay license fees if they own a TV or a radio.
7Own computation based on Open Society Institute (2005) and information provided by BFA – Broadcasting
Fee Association (see www.broadcastingfee.com). Further information on license fees is provided by Head (1985)
and Newcomb (2004). For a welfare analysis of private versus public broadcasting, see Anderson and Coate (2005).
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The size of the annual fee is substantial. In 2005, it ranged from e 206 to e 263 (the
fee varies between federal states). The amount is due per household, regardless of the
number of household members, TVs and radios.8 An enforcement problem exists since
public broadcasting programs can be received without paying the annual fees.9
The license fee system is managed by ‘Fee Information Service’ (Gebu¨hren Info Ser-
vice, henceforth GIS), a subsidiary of the Austrian Public Broadcasting Company. GIS
is responsible for collecting and enforcing the license fee and takes actions to sustain
compliance. To identify potential evaders, GIS compares residence data (i.e., a federal
database in which everyone must enroll with her place of residence) and data from direct
mailing companies with their own data on license fee registrations. If an individual lives
at a certain address without having registered any TV or radio – and if no one else in the
household pays fees – GIS sends a mailing to this person. The license Fee Act requires
mailing recipients to respond and to provide correct information. Data on those who do
not respond are handed over to GIS’ enforcement division. This division employs field
inspectors who check potential evaders at their homes (see Rincke and Traxler, 2010). In
fact, detections by field inspectors are quite frequent. In 2004, door-to-door inspections
resulted in a clearance rate of one third. A person who is detected evading the fee must
register and licensing inspectors typically date back the registration for several months,
i.e., a detected evader has to make supplementary payments.10 In addition, field inspec-
tors may report a case to the authorities who can then impose a fine of up to e 2,180. If
someone does not comply with the payment duty after an official report, legal proceedings
will be initiated. Austrians seem to be aware of the possible sanctions. A national survey
conducted in 2000 finds that 55 percent of respondents expect ‘severe’ or ‘very severe’
sanctions if they are detected evading TV license fees.11
GIS’ enforcement activities are reflected in a high compliance rate: in July 2005,
94 percent of all Austrian households were registered for license fees and payed a total
8We use the term household in a broad sense, including apartment-sharing communities, etc. In addition to
the fee that covers TV and radio, there exists a reduced fee (between e 60 to e 76) for radios only.
9As typical for Europe, most households receive TV via a simple rooftop antenna or a satellite dish. Cable
companies have no information about whether a household pays the license fee for public broadcasting. These
companies mind their own fees and do not exclude customers from viewing the public broadcasting channels.
10At the time of detection past savings from evasion are sunk. The retrospective payments thus create similar
incentives as a fine.
11For tax evasion via black labor market participation [absenteeism from work], the corresponding figure is 60
[38] percent . Details on this survey (N > 1000), which is further discussed in Traxler and Winter (2009), are
available from the authors.
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of e 644 million (0.3 percent of GDP). The 94 percent give a reasonable proxy for the
overall compliance level, as only one percent of households own neither a TV nor a radio
(ORF Medienforschung, 2006). Note, however, that compliance is in constant flux due to,
e.g., changes in the household composition or de-registrations of households that move or
simply state that they no longer operate any TV or radio. Thus, GIS constantly seeks to
improve its enforcement practice.
3 Experiment Design and Data
In collaboration with GIS, we experimentally manipulated mailings that were sent to
potential evaders of license fees. Following the standard procedures, a mailing contained
a cover letter, an information sheet and a response form with a postage prepaid envelope.
In the letter, GIS explains that – according to their data – the mailing recipient has not
registered any TV/radio and that the recipient is required by law to clarify the facts by
returning the response form within 14 days (see Appendix I for the full text of the cover
letter). The information sheet listed several key paragraphs of the License Fee Act. In
particular, it provided information about the payment duty, the size of the fee as well as
the maximum fine that can be imposed in case one is detected evading the fee (see section
2).
3.1 Treatments
The experiment varied the text of the cover letter. Everything else, the response form
and the information sheet, and thus the information on the possible fine, was kept the
same across all treatments. We used the standard GIS letter as control and varied the
text along three dimensions: we introduced a legal threat, social information, and a moral
appeal. In addition, we interacted the threat with the two other dimensions, resulting in
six different mailing treatments in total. Table 1 illustrates these treatments.12 Finally,
we also implemented a no-mailing condition (T0). Individuals in this untreated control
group did not receive a mailing.
12Our approach can be interpreted as an incomplete 2 × 2 × 2–design. At the benefit of a larger number of
observations in each treatment cell, we decided not to implement the interactions between the social information
and the moral appeal.
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[Table 1 about here.]
In the legal-threat treatments (T2, T4, and T6), the cover letter contained a para-
graph that communicates a significant detection probability and emphasizes potential
consequences of non-compliance (see Appendix I for details on all letters). We used the
following wording:
“If you do not respond to this letter, a staff member of GIS will contact you
in order to request information from you personally. If you refuse to provide
information or if there is a well-founded suspicion that you provide disinforma-
tion, GIS is obligated to order an inquiry by the responsible federal authorities.
Please keep in mind that in this case you may face legal consequences and
considerable costs.”
In treatments T3 and T4, the letter imparted social information, i.e., information about
the actual level of compliance with the law (as estimated by GIS). The relevant paragraph
was formulated as follows:
“Do you actually know that almost all citizens comply with this legal duty?
In fact, 94 percent – a vast majority of all households – have registered their
broadcasting receivers.”
Treatments T5 and T6 extended the standard cover letter by the following moral appeal:
“Those who do not conscientiously register their broadcasting receivers not only
violate the law, but also harm all honest households. Hence, registering is also
a matter of fairness.”
3.2 Sample and Implementation
GIS provided us with 50,498 addresses of potential evaders. From these data we first
took a 5 percent random subsample and assigned it to the no-mailing group (T0). We
then randomly allocated the remaining data to the six mailing treatments T1 – T6.
Table 2 provides summary statistics and demonstrates that the treatment assignment was
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orthogonal to observable individual and municipality characteristics.13 Further descriptive
statistics on the 1120 (out of 2300) Austrian municipalities covered by our sample are
provided in Table A.I in the Appendix.
[Table 2 about here.]
There is no deliberate selection of communities into the experiment. Following stan-
dard procedures, GIS collects updated residence data alternately from different munici-
palities as well as new data from direct mailing companies. Our sample is based on the
most recent data that were available to GIS in August 2005 and that were not used in
prior mailing campaigns. Hence, there is no ‘randomization bias’ (Levitt and List, 2009).
From these data, potential evaders were identified by GIS according to the procedures
described in the previous section. Thus, the final sample is not representative of the
overall population. Moreover, it covers individuals beyond the subpopulation of license
fee evaders. To illustrate this point and to facilitate the following analysis, we classify
the different types of individuals in the sample. First, there are evaders (A-types), indi-
viduals from households that have not registered their TVs/radios.14 Second, the sample
contains individuals who comply with their payment duty or live in a household that does
so (B-types). Nevertheless, these types are in the sample, either because of spelling errors
in the residence data or because they changed their address or name (e.g., after marriage)
without reporting these changes to GIS. Finally, the sample includes individuals who nei-
ther own a TV nor a radio (C-types). As we will discuss below, these different types face
different response options and different incentives to respond.
The mailings were sent by GIS in two waves between September 19 and October 17,
2005. In order to avoid confounding time effects, each wave contained all treatments in
equal proportions. Between September and December 2005, GIS made no changes in
their field inspection policy, nor did they inform anybody about our study. The mailing
recipients were not aware of participating in an experiment. Following the taxonomy by
13Kruskal Wallis tests, as well as variance analyses, confirm the null hypothesis of equality of means across
treatments of all variables in table 2.
14It typically takes several months until data on newly formed households or households that recently moved
appear in the residence data available to GIS. Those who have not yet registered their TV/radio by the time they
receive a mailing can therefore be called evaders rather than procrastinators.
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Harrison and List (2004), this feature distinguishes our study as a natural field experi-
ment.15
Mailing responses and unsolicited registrations in the no-mailing group were measured
by GIS’ computer system.16 This system allowed a highly accurate measurement of be-
havior: it tracked responses via the reply forms that were sent along with the mailings, it
recorded registrations that were made online or by phone, and it detected responses from
another individual living in the same household as the recipient of the mailing (e.g., the
spouse). Note further that the measurement of the experimental outcome was the same
for all mailing treatments. This is an important detail as it assures that the measurement
is orthogonal to the experimental conditions.
The mailing responses were classified into four categories:
(A) A new registration of a TV/radio.
(B) An update of contract details (name, address, etc.), or a statement that someone in
the household is already paying the fee.
(C) A statement of the recipient that there is no broadcasting receiver in the household.
(D) Any response that cannot be classified into the other categories.
These response categories can be directly linked to the type classification introduced
above. A-types, who are liable to pay fees, can either respond to the mailing by registering
(A), by asserting that they have no TV or radio in the household (C), or they can ignore
the mailing and not respond. B-types, who are already law-abiding, can either clarify
their status by a B–response or they can ignore the mailing. B–responses require a valid
registration number (e.g., from the registration of another household member). If GIS
cannot match the stated number with their data, the response is classified as category D.
Finally, C-types may respond in category C or not at all.17
15Harrison and List (2004) emphasize that the knowledge about being observed can induce a Hawthorne effect
on its own. Such an effect would be highly undesirable in empirical research that studies compliance with the
law. See Levitt and List (2007) for a general discussion of this issue.
16Individuals may register online, by calling GIS’ service hotline, or by sending a filled hard-copy registration
form that is available at banks, postal offices, etc.
17One could think of several other possibilities: an A-type could assert incorrectly that someone else in the
household pays fees. However, based on the registration number, this would be discovered and the response would
be coded as unclassified feedback. B-types might make a mistake and register a second time. Such errors would be
discovered by GIS, which is obliged to cancel the double registration. C-types could start to pay license fees even
if they do not have any broadcasting receivers – a scenario that is highly unlikely. All three types can produce a
response of class D.
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Note that one can unambiguously link A- and B-responses to particular types. Only
those who do not comply with the payment duty (A-types) can register for license fees
(A-response) and only law-abiding individuals (B-types) can send an update of contract
details (B-response). The primary focus of GIS is to maximize revenues, i.e., A-responses.
Their secondary target are B-responses. Updates about existing registrations allow GIS
to improve the targeting of their enforcement measures (mailings and field inspections) on
the non-compliant population. In the following, we will analyze both A- and B-responses.
This allows us to study whether strategies that are successful in enforcing compliance (a
high rate of A-responses) cause any undesirable impact on law-abiding individuals (on
B-responses). A type-specific response analysis is also interesting from a theoretical point
of view. As A- and B-types face different incentives to respond, the comparison of A- and
B-responses enables us to infer the causal effects driving the response to our interventions.
4 Discussion of Treatments
4.1 A-Responses
Consider an A-type who chooses between registering – i.e., paying license fees – and not
registering her TV. If she does not register and continues to evade the fee, she will be
detected with some probability. In this case, the evader has to pay the fee, supplemental
payments and maybe a fine. Rational decision makers trade off these potential costs with
the benefits from (not) registering. The decision depends on their risk preferences and –
with imperfect information on enforcement – the perceived sanction risk (Sah, 1991).
No-mailing Treatment. Comparing the no-mailing group, T0, with the mailing treat-
ments, T1–T6, the mere fact of receiving a mailing signals that GIS suspects the recipient
of violating the law. The A-types in the no-mailing group do not receive this surveillance
signal. Hence, we suppose that mailing recipients perceive a higher sanction risk and are
therefore more likely to register than individuals in the no-mailing condition. This effect
should be intensified by the fact that mailings lower the transaction cost of a registration.18
In addition, all mailings ask to respond within 14 days. Stating this (non-consequential)
18Recall that individuals in the no-mailing group can make an unsolicited registration by picking up, filling and
sending in a hard-copy registration form, or by registering online or by phone. In the context of charitable giving,
Huck and Rasul (2009) find strong transaction cost effects from mailing letters.
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deadline might reduce procrastination (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002). One might even
argue that mailings simply remind ‘unintentional evaders’ of their legal duty. We do not
consider this effect plausible, as GIS runs intensive media campaigns that stress the legal
obligation to register radios and TVs. (During the time of the experiment, for instance,
GIS placed on average three daily spots in countrywide broadcasted channels.)
Turning to the mailing treatments, it is important to recall that our six treatments
neither changed the ‘true’ economic incentives for compliance – the actual detection risk
and the magnitude of the sanctions were constant across all treatments – nor did they alter
the transaction costs for registering. It follows that any behavioral change in response to
our mailing treatments must be brought about by changes in the recipients’ perceptions.
Legal Threat. The legal threat aims at enforcing compliance through intervening di-
rectly with the perceived sanction risk.19 For the treatment to work, two conditions must
hold: first, the threat has to affect risk perceptions and, second, individuals who perceive
a higher sanction risk must be more likely to stop breaching the law. If these conditions
are met, the legal threat will increase the number of registrations. Regarding the first
condition, there should be room for manipulation if individuals have subjective expec-
tations.20 While this finds ample empirical support (e.g., Lochner, 2007), there is still
no clear-cut evidence to which extent policy changes – e.g., an increase in enforcement
efforts – translate into changes of risk perceptions (Nagin, 1998). For instance, mailing
recipients might not take the threat to be credible. Even if they do, it is an open question
whether the treatment shocks perceptions beyond the level that is induced by the mere
fact of receiving any mailing.
Given that our manipulation successfully increases risk perceptions, it is still not cer-
tain that the threat will trigger more registrations. This point is made by the motivation
crowding literature that considers the possibility of increased external incentives – in the
form of stricter enforcement – crowding out the intrinsic motives for compliance with the
law (Frey, 1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Evidence in support of this case is pro-
vided by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), who showed that introducing a fine reinforced
19The threat letter may also convey information on how society views non-compliance. However, the survey
results (discussed below) strongly suggest that the threat affects behavior via altering perceptions regarding the
legal but not the social sanction risk.
20Manski (2004) offers a review of the subjective expectations literature. For recent contributions on the role
of subjective expectations for law enforcement, see Lochner (2007) and Hjalmarsson (2009).
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the sanctioned behavior. Slemrod et al. (2001) observed an equally counterintuitive ef-
fect. Threatening taxpayers with an increased audit probability resulted in a decline of
reported income among high-income groups. These findings relate to a growing number of
studies that demonstrate detrimental effects of economic incentives (Fehr and List, 2004;
Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009).
Social Information. There are two alternative channels over which the social infor-
mation treatment can affect the decision to register. The first builds upon standard
deterrence incentives and derives from the ‘broken windows theory’ (Wilson and Kelling,
1982). According to this approach, signs of non-compliance (‘broken windows’) may sig-
nal lax enforcement and thereby trigger further deviations from the law. The information
about a 94 percent compliance rate (see section 2) should thus have a positive effect on
registrations from individuals who initially expect lower levels of compliance. The oppo-
site holds for those who initially consider compliance to be higher than communicated.
Social norms and conformity motives are the second channel for the information treat-
ment to influence behavior (Elster, 1989; Bernheim, 1994). This is pointed out by legal
scholars, who argue that compliance is enforced not only by formal, but also by informal
social sanctions (see the references in footnote 1). As norm enforcement is considered to
be stronger the more people adhere to a social norm, individuals might condition their
compliance on others’ norm-adherence (similar to conditional cooperation; see, e.g., Fis-
chbacher and Ga¨chter, 2009). The case for conditional compliance is made by Traxler and
Winter (2009), who find that half of the participants in a national survey in Austria are
willing to impose sanctions on license fee evaders. They further show that the inclination
to sanction declines with the belief about the pervasiveness of non-compliance. If this
pattern is correctly anticipated, we arrive at the same prediction as above: among those
who initially expect low compliance rates, the social information will signal that social
(rather than legal) sanctions are stronger than expected. In turn, this should increase
registrations.21
21Similar caveats apply to this hypothesis as for the legal threat. In particular, it is not clear whether the
nationwide compliance rate (rather than a local rate) shapes perceptions about legal or social sanctions. Moreover,
the importance of social interaction in evasion behavior is still elusive, as shown by Fortin et al. (2007), who do
not find any social interaction in a lab experiment, and by Galbiati and Zanella (2008), who find a large social
multiplier in evasion behavior.
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Moral Appeal. The moral appeal treatment stresses that evading license fees harms
honest households, which violates not only the legal, but also a fairness norm. Psychology
research has illustrated the importance of personal norms and moral concepts – as well
as their salience – as driving forces of behavior Cialdini (1998). Individuals’ judgements
seem to be guided by moral shortcuts that are sensitive to framing effects Sunstein (2004).
Provided that our framing makes a relevant moral concept more salient, one might expect
the moral appeal to have a positive impact on registrations.
This prediction is at odds with several studies in the domain of tax enforcement that
hardly find any evidence on the effectiveness of moral suasion (Blumenthal et al., 2001;
Wenzel and Taylor, 2004). From an economic perspective this is not surprising: the appeal
has no informational content and preferences, even when they reflect social motives, are
considered to be stable. Quite on the contrary, the treatment might even backfire as the
moral appeal could “be read as a sign that the enforcement system cannot cope and must
resort to rhetoric instead” (Bardach, 1989, p. 62) .
4.2 B-Responses
Remember that B-types are equally obliged to respond to the mailings as A-types. How-
ever, GIS never imposes sanctions on complying individuals when they do not respond.
Hence, there are zero costs for not responding. At the same time, responding entails only
minor transaction costs since the return mailing is prepaid. From an economic perspec-
tive, it is therefore difficult to assess the treatments’ impact – in particular, the effect of
the moral appeal and the social information – on B-types’ response behavior. Of course,
B-types might not be aware that they face no sanction risk or they simply want to avoid
an interaction with a field inspector – an event they may find embarrassing even if there
are no material consequences at stake. Moreover, signalling models in the fashion of Ben-
abou and Tirole (2006) suggest that B-types have a desire to signal that they are ‘good
guys’ who comply with their legal duty. All these motives might interact with the legal
threat.
According to signaling models, the legal threat could have a detrimental effect on B-
responses, if the treatment reduces the value of the ‘good type’-signal for B-types. If the
expected embarrassment from a field inspection drives the response, or if B-types expect
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economic sanctions, the threat should increase the frequency of B-responses, as long as
the treatment increases the perceived chance of an inspection. The impact of the threat
should be smaller, however, the lower the expected costs from an inspection are. This
has straightforward implications for the comparison of response between A- and B-types.
Given that the threat does increase the perceived inspection risk of both types, B-types
should be less sensitive to the threat than A-types as long as the former expect lower
sanctions than the latter.
5 Results of the Experiment
We now turn to the results from the field experiment. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provide a
non-parametric analysis of the treatment effects. Section 5.3 complements the analysis
by estimation results. Section 5.4 offers evidence on interaction effects of the information
as well as the threat treatment with municipality characteristics. A detailed discussion of
our findings is deferred to section 7.
5.1 Overall effect of sending mailings
Table 3 compares the frequency of registrations (A-responses) in treatments T1–T6 to
the unsolicited registrations in the control group (T0) in intervals of 25 days.22 Within
25 days after sending the first mailings, only 8 out of the 2,586 individuals (0.31 percent)
registered for license fees in the no-mailing group. In contrast, 2,794 out of 47,912 mailings
(5.83 percent) resulted in a registration within the first 25 days after sending the respective
mailing. The difference is highly significant (p = 0.000, according to a two-sided test on
the equality of proportions). In the second 25 days, the registration rate was 0.50 percent
in the control group and 1.83 percent in the mailing treatments (p = 0.000). Beyond 50
days, we do not observe any differences in registration rates. Hence, the impact of the
mailings on registrations is limited to the first 50 days.
[Table 3 about here.]
22A similar picture emerges if biweekly or weekly intervals are considered.
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After 50 days, 0.81 percent of the individuals in the no-mailing condition were reg-
istered. In the mailing treatments, the cumulated registration rate was 7.67 percent –
nearly 10 times higher. Assuming that newly registered households pay license fees for at
least one year, the expected revenue per mailing (net of the marginal cost for printing,
postage, etc.) amounts to e 15.23 We conclude that the mailing campaign is highly effec-
tive in raising revenues. As discussed above, the huge effect of the mailings can be due
to reduced transaction costs, the mailings’ impact on the perceived sanction risk, or to a
combination of both effects. In section 6, we will present further evidence that allows to
assess the relevance of these possible causes.
5.2 Effects of the mailing treatments
Table 4 summarizes the results for the mailing treatments T1–T6. On average, 14.41 per-
cent of the mailings could not be delivered because of erroneous addresses resulting from
typos in individual and street names in the GIS data base. Due to the random assign-
ment, however, the share of non-delivered mailings does not statistically differ between
treatments (χ2-test: p = .793). In the following, we report responses relative to mailings
delivered rather than mailings sent. Motivated by the results from above, we focus on the
response within 50 days. All our results are robust to extending this observation period.
[Table 4 about here.]
Consider first A-responses. Recall that only evaders (A-types) can register. The share
of registrations thus measures the treatments’ success in enforcing compliance. Table 4
shows that, on average, 8.95 percent of recipients responded with a registration of their
TV or radio.24 A comparison of the registration rates reveals a significant positive effect
of the legal threat between T1 and T2 (p = 0.034), T3 and T4 (p = 0.003), and between
T5 and T6 (p = 0.020).25 In contrast, neither the social information nor the moral appeal
23According to GIS, one year is a very conservative assumption on the average registration spell. The calculation
further accounts for the fact that, in our sample, 95 percent registered TV plus radio and 5 percent registered
only a radio, resulting in a reduced fee (see footnote 8).
24As the precise distribution of A-, B- and C-types in our sample is not identified, one cannot judge whether
the 8.95 percent corresponds to a particularly low or high type-specific response rate. For a closer discussion, see
Appendix IV.
25The treatments also affect how quickly mailing recipients respond with a registration. The time pattern of
A-responses is discussed in Appendix III.
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have any significant effects (T1 vs. T3: p = 0.320, T1 vs.T5: p = 0.369). This finding
does not change when the two treatments are interacted with the threat (T2 vs. T4:
p = 0.948; T2 vs. T6: p = 0.493).
Second, we turn to B-responses. Table 4 indicates that 28.04 percent updated their
information on a valid registration. The legal threat shows no effect between the treat-
ments T1 and T2 (p = 0.437), nor between T3 and T4 (p = 0.625). It is significant only
between T5 and T6 (p = 0.002), when it interacts with the moral appeal treatment. How-
ever, the moral framing per se has a significantly negative impact on update responses
(T1 vs. T5: p = 0.000). In treatment T6, the threat only partially counterbalances this
negative effect, so that the response rate is still below the one in treatment T2 (T2 vs.
T6: p = 0.059). The social information treatment also triggers a significant decline in
B-responses (T1 vs. T3: p = 0.031; T2 vs. T4: p = 0.014).
Finally, for category C responses – individuals who declare not to have any broad-
casting receiver – the legal threat has a slightly positive impact that is significant at a
10 percent margin between treatment T1 and T2 (p = 0.063). Unlike for A- and B-
responses, this effect cannot be attributed to a single type: it could be driven either by
A-types who pretend not to hold a broadcasting receiver or by honestly-responding C-
types. Concerning category D (unclassified response), there are no significant treatment
effects.
5.3 Regression analysis
A-Responses. We complement the analysis by estimating regressions on A-responses.
As dependent variable we use a dummy PAi that indicates whether individual i registered
(A-response) within 50 days.26 We consider the model
PAi = α+ βMailingi + γ1 Threati + γ2Morali + γ3 Infoi + εi. (1)
26As discussed in Appendix IV, this variable – which is insensitive to responses from B- and C-types – is
determined by the share of A-types in the sample and their response behavior. The accurate frequency of A-types
is not identified. Moreover, one cannot simply make use of the bounds on the type distribution that are implied by
the frequency of B-responses, since these responses are also sensitive to the treatments. Our estimations assume
that each mailing recipient could produce an A-response. This yields consistent estimates of the treatment effects
on the observed registration frequency for our sample. However, as there is a non-negligible share of B-types, we
will underestimate the type specific treatment effects (see Appendix IV).
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The variable Mailing i captures the basic effect of receiving a mailing, taking registrations
in the no-mailing condition as benchmark. Threat i, Infoi and Moral i are treatment dum-
mies equal to one if individual i received a mailing that included the legal threat (T2, T4,
and T6), social information (T3 and T4) or a moral appeal (T5 and T6), respectively.
The γ-coefficients thus measure the treatments’ impact on registrations, relative to the
baseline mailing T1. To account for potential interactions between the treatments, we
step-by-step include Threat×Moral i and Threat×Infoi in equation (1). All equations are
estimated using the linear probability model.27 The results are reported in table 5.
[Table 5 about here.]
The regressions confirm our findings from above. Receiving a mailing has a significant
and strongly positive effect on registrations. Among the different mailing treatments,
the threat significantly increases individuals’ propensity to register by one percentage
point. Neither the moral appeal nor the social information have a significant effect. The
outcome from column (I) remains unchanged when we account for treatment interactions:
none of the interaction terms in columns (II) to (IV) is statistically significant.28 While
the first set of estimations is based on the full sample, we drop the no-mailing sample
and exclude all observations with non-deliverable mailings in columns (V)–(VIII).29 The
second set of regressions shows that the estimated treatment effects hardly change. As
a further robustness check we include additional control variables, like recipients’ gender
and several municipality characteristics in the estimations (see table A.I in Appendix II).
Adding these variables leaves the estimates basically unaffected, demonstrating that the
controls are orthogonal to our treatments due to the successful randomization.
The results provided above corroborate the role of the incentives highlighted in the
economic analysis of crime. Threatening evaders with inspections clearly works as an
enforcement strategy, whereas the moral appeal and the social information fail. The
27In the following, we estimate equations with many interaction terms as explanatory variables. Computing
correct interaction effects in non-linear models becomes tedious and computationally quite intensive (see Ai and
Norton, 2003). Therefore, and to ease comparability between estimations, we employ the linear probability
model throughout the whole paper. The results from tables 5 and 6 are basically identical to those from probit
estimations, which are available from the authors upon request.
28Based on the estimations in columns (IV) and (VIII), an F-test indicates that one cannot reject the null that
both interaction terms equal zero (p = 0.728 and p = 0.814, respectively).
29Information on erroneous addresses, i.e., non-delivered mailings, is not available for the no-mailing sample.
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legal threat increases the registration rate by slightly more than one percentage point as
compared to an estimated 8.5 percentage points for the baseline mailing. This suggests
that the threat successfully altered individuals’ risk perceptions. (Additional evidence
supporting this interpretation is discussed below.) The registration rates in the legal
threat treatments are about 15 percent above the rates in the mailing treatments without
the threat paragraph. Under conservative assumptions (see footnote 23), our change
in the wording of the cover letter thus produced an increase in expected revenues per
delivered mailing of e 2.50. For the 100,000 mailings delivered by GIS per year, this
would correspond to an additional revenue of e 250,000.
In contrast to the legal threat, the strategies based on moral appeals and the provision
of social information fail to increase compliance. The ineffectiveness of the moral appeal,
however, does not necessarily indicate that moral standards are irrelevant for compliance
with the law. As our mailings were targeted to a specific sample of individuals who deviate
from the law, it is likely that they do not share the activated moral value (Meares et al.,
2004). This interpretation is supported by evidence of Pruckner and Sausgruber (2008),
who report that people respond to a moral appeal only if they have internalized a norm
against cheating.
B-Responses. Next, we consider the treatments impact on update responses. We regress
the dummy variable PBi that indicates whether individual i updated her contract detail, on
our treatment variables.30 As we cannot measure contract updates among the no-mailing
group, we focus on the mailing sample and exclude data on non-delivered mailings.
While column (I) in table 6 indicates a positive effect of the legal threat, columns (II)
and (IV) show that the effect is not robust when we account for the interaction between
the threat and the moral appeal. The interaction term is significant in specification (II),
but not in (IV).31 For all specifications presented in table 6, the main treatment effects of
the moral appeal and the social information are significantly negative. Similar to above,
adding additional control variables does not affect the estimation results.
[Table 6 about here.]
30Regarding type identification, similar caveats apply as above (see footnote 26 and Appendix IV).
31An F-test does not reject the joint hypothesis of both interaction terms being zero (p = 0.121 for specification
(IV). However, the F-test clearly rejects the null of the Threat and Threat × Moral being both zero (p = 0.005
for specification (IV)).
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The estimations, in particular the model in specification (IV), show no robust effect of
the legal threat per se. This suggests that B-types are not driven by the desire to avoid
an interaction with a field inspector. Given that law-abiding individuals are aware that
they face no real sanction threat, the evidence is consistent with the deterrence hypothesis
and, at the same time, with the significantly positive response of A-types to the threat:
A-types fear sanctions and are thus sensitive to legal threats. B-types do not expect any
fines and are thus insensitive. Section 6 provides further evidence on A- and B-types’
perceptions, supporting this interpretation.
It is not straightforward to explain the negative effect observed for the moral appeal
and the social information treatment. Both treatments have in common that they point
to non-compliance. The moral framing, for instance, explicitly reminds B-types of being
cheated (‘...harm all honest households ’). Stressing the fact that some people cheat them
might undermine the law-abiding individuals’ propensity to respond to the mailing. The
threat may offset this effect, as it documents the authority’s efforts to impose sanctions on
those who do not comply with their legal duties, thus resulting in the positive interaction
found in specification (II).
5.4 Interaction Effects with Municipality Characteristics
5.4.1 Heterogeneous Effects of Social Information
The fact that the social information treatment did not increase A-responses on aggregate is
not conclusive for a final evaluation of this treatment. As discussed in section 4, providing
social information should increase registrations only among those who initially expect
compliance to be lower than communicated. GIS permitted neither to experimentally
vary the communicated compliance level (similar to Frey and Meier, 2004) nor to elicit
prior beliefs in our sample. We therefore evaluate the prediction by exploiting a link
between individual beliefs and local evasion levels estimated by GIS.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In a national survey conducted in the year 2000, more than 1000 Austrian households
were asked to state their belief about the frequency of license fee evasion (see Traxler and
21
Winter, 2009). Figure 1 plots the distribution of the response (measured on a five-point
Likert scale ranging from ‘very frequent’ to ‘very infrequent’) against GIS’ estimate of
the local evasion rate (in the categories 0-5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-30 and above 30 percent) in
the respondent’s home district at the time of the survey.32 The figure reveals a strong
correlation of beliefs with the local evasion levels. In regions with an evasion rate below 5
percent, more than 75 percent believe that dodging the fee is infrequent or very infrequent.
In districts with evasion levels above 30 percent, this number drops to 33 percent. Vice
versa, the share of respondents who believe that evasion is frequent or very frequent rises
from 11 percent in low evasion regions to 34 percent in districts with high levels of non-
compliance. Estimating ordered probit models that control for individual characteristics
confirms this correlation.33
Provided that beliefs and local evasion levels are similarly correlated for the individuals
in our sample, we expect a positive effect of the social information in municipalities with
a high evasion rate. This is tested by estimating an equation that interacts our treatment
variables with the local evasion level,
PAi = α+ β1 Threati + β2Morali + β3 Infoi + γ0Evasion
Q1
i (2)
+ γ1 Threati × EvasionQ1i + γ2Morali × EvasionQ1i + γ3 Infoi × EvasionQ1i
+Xi δ + εi,
where EvasionQ1i is a dummy indicating whether recipient i lives in a municipality that
ranges in the top quartile of the local evasion rates. The vector of control variables Xi
includes the recipient’s gender and several municipality characteristics (see table A.I in
the Appendix). The coefficients β1, β2 and β3 measure the main treatment effects (on
individuals not living in high-evasion municipalities). Any additional effects in high-
evasion municipalities are taken up by γ1, γ2 and γ3; the non-interacted difference in
registrations is captured by γ0. According to our hypothesis, γ3 as well as β3 + γ3, the
overall effect of the social information treatment in high evasion municipalities, should be
positive.
32The estimate for local evasion corresponds to one minus the share of households who are registered for license
fees relative to the total number of households living in a jurisdiction (see table 2).
33The estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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[Table 7 about here.]
Column (I) in table 7 displays the results from estimating equation (2). In column (II),
we introduce a full set of municipality dummies. In both specifications, γ3 is positive and
significant at a 10 percent level. In specifications (III) and (IV), where we replace Eva-
sionQ1i with Evasion
T1
i , a dummy for the top tercile regarding the local evasion rates, we
obtain virtually identical results. The estimates demonstrate a significantly different ef-
fect of the social information treatment in municipalities with widespread non-compliance
compared to municipalities with low evasion rates. In the former, providing information
has a positive, in the latter a weakly negative effect. However, the treatments’ overall
impact in high-evader municipalities is not significantly different from the baseline – an
F-test does not reject the null hypothesis β3 + γ3 = 0 (p = 0.226 and p = 0.212 for
specification (I) and (II), respectively). Moreover, we do not observe any significant inter-
action effect once we estimate a model with linear treatment interactions with the evasion
rate Evasion i. Hence, the observed effect is not very robust. Finally, it is worth noting
that the coefficient from the moral appeal is significantly negative in specification (I) and
(III). The moral framing tends to exert a significantly negative effect on registrations in
a sizable subsample of our study. This effect also appears in the following analysis.
5.4.2 Further Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
There is substantial heterogeneity across municipalities in our sample. The municipalities’
population size, for instance, ranges from a mere 100 to 240,000 individuals for Vienna’s
largest district. This heterogeneity allows us to explore the role of municipality character-
istics in altering the impact of our treatments.34 We focus on A-responses and estimate
interaction models similar to those from above, either including the full set of control
variables or municipality dummies. The results from these estimations are reported in
table 8.
The first column of the table reveals that the effectiveness of mailings in raising reg-
istrations decreases with the population size. Relative to the other mailings, however,
the threat is more successful in larger municipalities. The main effect of the threat re-
mains significant in both specifications (I) and (II). This is in line with the results from
34We also investigated heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the age and gender of the mailing
recipients. Neither treatment shows significant interactions with these variables.
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columns (III) and (IV), which display a stronger effect of the threat in municipalities in
the top quartile of population density. The legal threat seems to have a larger effect in
urban areas. Like in table 7, we find a significantly negative effect of the moral appeal
in specifications (I) and (III). The latter estimation also indicates a positive interaction
with the population density. However, both effects of the moral appeal vanish once we
include municipality dummies.
Columns (V) and (VI) further show that the threat is slightly more effective in mu-
nicipalities with an average income in the top end of the distribution. However, the
interaction is only significant at the 10 percent level in the FE–specification. Column
(VII) and (VIII) report the interaction with the political orientation. The legal threat
is most effective in municipalities with many center-left voters and has a weaker effect
in more right-leaning municipalities. We considered several additional treatment interac-
tions, for instance with the population inflow into municipalities. This variable should,
ceteris paribus, positively correlate with the frequency of evaders who recently moved but
did not yet register at the new place (in contrast to those who already evade for a longer
time). Estimations did not indicate any significant interaction effects.
[Table 8 about here.]
Finally, we studied the sensitivity of our results with respect to the municipalities’
mailing coverage, i.e., the number of mailings relative to the municipality population.
One might suspect that communication between recipients of different mailings could
undermine the treatment effects. In fact, we estimate a slightly stronger effect of the legal
threat if we exclude the top quartile of municipalities regarding mailing coverage (not
reported). Running the estimations from table 7 on the restricted sample, one also obtains
a stronger effect of the social information. These stronger treatment effects, however,
seem to be driven by type composition rather than by treatment spillover effects. To see
this point, note that a high mailing coverage indicates that GIS has little information
from prior mailing campaigns in these municipalities and thus addresses many B-types.
This is well reflected in our data: the rate of B-responses exceeds 44 percent in the top
quartile regarding mailing coverage, as compared to 24 percent in the remaining sample.
Excluding high-coverage municipalities, we thus obtain stronger treatment effects on A-
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responses simply because the frequency of B-types is lower (see Appendix IV). In any
case, our findings are highly robust when we account for heterogenous mailing coverage.
6 Perception Survey
Our experiment establishes controlled field evidence on the causal impact of different in-
terventions on compliance behavior. To understand better the mechanisms behind these
results, we conducted an anonymous survey that evaluates the treatments’ impact on sub-
jective perceptions. The web-based survey was implemented among a sample of students
from the University of Innsbruck. (GIS did not allow us to approach the subjects from
the field experiment.) 3,233 participants completed the survey. Details on the procedure
are described in Appendix V.
[Table 9 about here.]
Survey participants were randomly confronted with one of two scenarios. One scenario
described an A-type vignette (a person who moved to a new place six months ago and
evades the fee since then), the other one a B-type vignette (someone who moved six month
ago, paid the fee, but did not inform GIS about the change in address). After participants
read the scenario description, the web page randomly linked them to a situation that
mimicked one of the treatments from the field experiment. A random subsample formed
the control (T0). All others were instructed that the vignette person received a mailing
from GIS. Thereafter a cover letter, which corresponds to one of our six mailing treatments
(T1–T6), was displayed on the web page. Survey participants were then asked to evaluate
the situation of the person. In this way, we elicited the treatments’ impact on perceptions
regarding, e.g., the risk of a field inspection, the size of fines, and potential social sanctions.
Consider first how the treatments affect the perceived inspection risk. Table 9 shows
the outcome of regressing the stated risk perception (ranging from 0 and 100) on the
treatments and the scenario type. By far the largest impact on perceptions is induced
by the mailing conditions. After being confronted with a mailing, survey participants
evaluate the household’s inspection risk to be roughly 60 percent higher than in the no-
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mailing group.35 This suggests that the huge overall impact of the mailings observed in
the field experiment is also driven by an alert effect. Next to lowering transaction costs,
the mailings signal surveillance and thereby increase the risk perception. Among the mail-
ing treatments, only the legal threat shows a significant effect. Compared to the baseline
mailing (T1), the threat increases the expected inspection risk by another 5 percent. Spec-
ification (II) includes control variables on the respondents’ personal characteristics. This
hardly changes the point estimates of the treatment effects. The same holds true when
we estimate Tobit instead of OLS regressions. Remarkably, similar regression analyses on
perceived social sanctions reveal that the legal threat – just like the two other mailing
conditions – does not affect respondents’ expectations. This result corroborates the view
that the legal threat does not evoke a social dimension. The threat is effective because it
increases the perceived risk of formal sanctions.
Regarding the expected size of fines, we do not find neither an impact of the legal threat
nor any mailing effect. The survey reveals, however, that participants expect significantly
lower fines for B- than for A-types (p = 0.003, according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Equivalently, B-types are also expected to face significantly weaker social sanctions in case
of an inspection (p = 0.003). These findings are consistent with the fact that GIS does
not impose fines on B-types and supports our interpretation of the heterogenous impact
of the legal threat on A- and B-types established in the field experiment (see section 5.2):
the legal threat is successful in enforcing registrations because it increases the perceived
inspection risk and because A-types expect significant sanctions. While the threat also
induces B-types to perceive a higher chance of facing a field inspector, the inspection
is rationally expected to have few consequences. Thus, the threat treatment does not
increase B-responses.
7 Conclusions
We tested different strategies to enforce compliance with the law in a large-scale natu-
ral field experiment. The experiment manipulated the text of personalized mailings that
were sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. Treatment effects were evaluated by
35The percentage is based on the estimates from specification (I) in table 9, putting the coefficient for the
mailing dummy relative to the constant.
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comparing the response of recipients, in particular whether evaders start to comply with
the payment duty. We gathered supplementary data from a survey that studied the treat-
ments’ impact on subjective perceptions. These data enabled us to analyze the mechanism
linking different policy manipulations, perceptions, and behavior. The main contributions
of our study are twofold. First, we provide strong and conceptually consistent support
for the economic model of crime, in particular, for the deterrent effect from increasing the
expected costs of a law violation. Second, we show that alternative enforcement strategies
are, by and large, unsuccessful and discuss the reasons for the failure.
Regarding the first contribution, we demonstrate that the authority can successfully
deter law violations by manipulating individuals’ perceived costs of non-compliance. The
study contains three pieces of evidence in support of this conclusion. First, comparing
those who received a mailing with an untreated control group, we find a striking impact
of the mailings. The fraction of evaders who start to comply with the payment duty
is nearly 10 times higher in the mailing condition. The huge effect is equally reflected
in the survey, which reveals that mailings alert individuals to the risk of being detected
as violators. In combination with a reduction in transaction costs, this alerting effect
creates the pronounced change in behavior. Second, adding a legal threat to a neutral
letter induces a further, considerable increase in compliance. Because the setup of the
experiment excludes incapacitation and displacement effects, the result provides clean,
experimental evidence on deterrence in the field. The survey data corroborate the findings
from the experiment, indicating that the effect of the threat is indeed caused by increasing
individuals’ expectations about the price of non-compliance. Finally, we take advantage
of the fact that our sample consists of heterogenous types: evaders who face potentially
severe sanctions and others, who are not exposed to economic sanctions. In line with
rational behavior, the legal threat produces a strong response only among the former.
Taken together, this first set of results lends compelling support to the power of price
effects, as they are highlighted in the economic analysis of non-compliance.
A further property of the legal threat is that it has no negative effect on the behavior
of individuals who abide by the law. This observation is of great importance from a
policy perspective. In most natural situations, law-abiding and law-violating individuals
are exposed to the same enforcement strategies, just like in our experiment. For an
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effective enforcement policy, it is therefore essential not to cause detrimental impact on
the compliant population. Regarding non-compliant individuals, our results show an
unrestrictedly positive effect of the threat on compliance. The treatment’s success is
robust for all strata within our sample and insensitive to interactions with additional
treatments. Note, however, that our study only measures short-run responses. In the
long run, the effectiveness of legal threats presumably relies on the actual enforcement
activities. The costs of maintaining the credibility of deterrent threats stimulate the
search for alternative enforcement strategies, leading to our second set of results.
Our second contribution consists of testing moral appeals and the provision of social
information as instruments of enforcement. Compared to a neutral mailing, both strate-
gies failed to increase aggregate compliance. To evaluate the ineffectiveness of the moral
suasion, it is important to note that our mailings were targeted at a sample of individuals
who deviate from the law. Thus, it is likely that the activated moral value is not shared
by the recipients. Appealing to a conflicting norm might further reduce the willingness
to comply with the law. In line with this interpretation, we find a negative effect of the
appeal in large subsamples of our study. Hence, moral appeals are no attractive strategy
to enforce compliance among those who deliberately violate the law.
While the social information treatment is ineffective on aggregate, the treatments’
impact on behavior crucially relies on individuals’ prior beliefs about the compliance of
others: with non-common priors, the information that 94 percent of all Austrians follow
the law can affect beliefs – and thus compliance – in either direction. Our empirical assess-
ment of this hypothesis makes use of supplementary evidence that documents a positive
correlation between the perceived and the actual local compliance rate. Exploiting this
correlation, we uncover significantly different treatment effects in municipalities with low
and high compliance rates. In the former, where evasion is believed to be common, the
social information has a positive, in the latter a weakly negative impact. This conditional
compliance effect, however, is not very strong. To test social information policies com-
prehensively, future research should experimentally vary the provided information. Our
findings already demonstrate that belief management, i.e., policy interventions that aim
at affecting subjective beliefs, may not be easily applicable to change behavior towards
the desired direction. With non-common priors, one and the same piece of information
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can convey different messages and cause contrary reactions. To render belief management
successful, it is necessary to communicate the right piece of information to the appropriate
target group – a precondition that might be very costly to meet in practice.
To sum up, our study provides clear-cut evidence on the deterrent effect of legal threats.
While legal threats unambiguously work as an enforcement strategy, neither moral appeals
nor imparting social information result in an increase of compliance. All our results are
consistently explained by the incentives for compliance considered in the economic model
of crime. Designing successful enforcement policies that rely on behavioral motives beyond
the incentives considered in the Beckerian analysis remains a challenging task for future
research.
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NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Appendix I: Text and Layout of Mailings
Note that the texts of all treatment manipulations were approved by GIS’ legal de-
partment. Below we report the translated mailing texts and an original copy of a mailing
that illustrates the layout.
I.1 Standard Cover Letter (Control Treatment T1)
Dear Mr. X,
You listen to radio, you watch TV? Then you are aware of the program variety offered by
Austrian Public Broadcasting. The provision of these services, however, requires funding.
Therefore, everybody who owns a radio or a TV has to pay license fees. It is the task of
GIS Gebu¨hren Info Service GmbH to ensure that all TV and radio consumers pay these
fees.
[1]
Our data base does not show a registration of TV or radio equipment at
your address. This can have several reasons:
– We may have made a mistake in our data base and you are already registered at
GIS. In this case, we apologize in advance.
– Your registration data may have changed, e.g., due to a move or a name change
(marriage), and our computer system cannot match the data with your registration.
– You may not hold a radio or a TV at this address and therefore do not have to
register anything.
– Maybe you have just forgotten to register your TV or radio.
We are legally obliged to clarify this issue and kindly ask you to answer our questions –
even if you have already registered at GIS. On the back of this letter you find a response
form. Please fill in this form and send it back within the next 14 days.
[2]
We thank you for your cooperation. If you require further information, please call our
service hotline at 0810 00 10 80 (Monday to Friday, 8.00 am to 9.00 pm, Saturday from
9.00 am to 5.00 pm) or visit our web page at www.orf-gis.at. Kind regards, your GIS–
Team.
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I.2 Legal Threat
In the legal threat treatments (T2, T4 and T6), the cover letter includes the following
paragraph at position [2] of the standard letter:
If you do not respond to this letter, a staff member of GIS will contact you
in order to request information from you personally. If you refuse to provide
information or if there is a well-founded suspicion that you provide disinformation, GIS is
obligated to order an inquiry by the responsible federal authorities. Please keep in mind
that in this case you may face legal consequences and considerable costs.
I.3 Social Information
In the social information mailings (treatments T3 and T4), we add the following paragraph
at position [1] of the standard letter:
Do you actually know that almost all citizens comply with this legal duty? In
fact, 94 percent – a vast majority of all households – have registered their broadcasting
receivers.
I.4 Moral Appeal
The treatments with a moral appeal (T5 and T6), included the following paragraph at
position [1]:
Those who do not conscientiously register their broadcasting receivers not only
violate the law, but also harm all honest households. Hence, registering is also
a matter of fairness.
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I.5 Original Copy
Original mailing for treatment T4 (Info × Threat)
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Appendix II: Summary Statistics on Municipality Characteristics
Table A.I: Municipality control variables
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max
PopSize population size 43, 085.37 74, 649.49 62.00 240, 278.00
PopDensity inhabitants/ha 8.52 23.84 0.01 256.30
Compliance compliance rate in 2005 93.51 5.87 58.24 143.54∗
Mailing Coverage mailings relative to PopSize 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.20
AvIncome average income/year in e 20, 863.45 2150.70 17, 497.13 36, 105.19
AvEducation average years of education 11.17 0.47 9.72 13.23
AvAge average age of inhabitants in years 48.03 1.18 42.81 54.18
Unemployed unemployment rate 3.14 1.67 0 16.96
Migration % of population inflow from moving 5.26 3.14 0.39 31.70
Foreign % of non-Austrian nationalities 9.37 5.44 0 50.32
VoteLeft % of votes for left parties∗∗ 11.80 5.23 0 37.23
VoteCenterLeft % of votes for center-left party 27.07 12.33 2.00 78.41
VoteRight % of votes for right parties 18.53 5.56 4.00 46.00
StudentShare % of students 1.84 1.16 0 6.67
HomeOwner % of home owners 57.85 19.80 10.06 98.27
FamMarried % of married households 42.78 2.73 31.67 54.16
FamDiv % of divorced and widowed households 11.55 4.10 3.78 20.42
CathShare % of Roman Catholics 80.83 14.49 20.06 99.90
OrthShare % of Catholic Orthodox 1.48 1.75 0 11.37
Sample 41,007 (delivered mailings)
Notes: ∗ Compliance rates above 100% are due to municipalities where households have registered their TVs
but no longer live there (many households do not unregister license fees after moving, but continue to pay fees
under their old address). ∗∗ Vote shares are in percentage of the electorate rather than casted votes.
Appendix III: Response Time
Figure A.I compares the relative as well as the cumulated frequencies of registrations
(A-responses) per week between the baseline treatment (T1) and the threat (T2), social-
information (T3), and the moral-appeal (T5) treatments, respectively. The figure shows
that the threat increases registrations particularly in the first two weeks after sending the
mailings (upper left panel); within this period, the other two treatments show hardly any
difference to the baseline. The average response time in the threat treatments is 22.1 days
(23.7 in the treatments without a threat). In the moral appeal, we observe an average of
24.4 days.
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Figure A.I: Time pattern of A-Responses (registrations): base vs. legal threat (top left),
base vs. social information (top right), and base vs. moral appeal
Recall that the mailings request recipients to respond within two weeks. We therefore
estimated the treatments’ impact on A-responses within this period (using estimations
equivalent to those from section 5.2.1). The findings are similar to the results presented
in the main text. The legal threat increases registrations within the first two weeks by
nearly 20 percent. While the social information has no significant effect, we find a highly
significant effect of the moral appeal. The treatment reduces response by 18 percent as
compared to the neutrally framed mailing. As indicated in the lower panel of figure A.I,
the gap to the base treatment starts to decline with week four. Therefore, we do not find
a significantly negative effect of the moral appeal when we focus on the response within
50 days (or more).
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Appendix IV: Type Heterogeneity
Let us denote the share of evaders (A-types) and law-abiding persons (B-types) in our
sample by sA and sB, respectively. The fraction of those without TV or radio (C-types)
is 1 − sA − sB. Given the type specific response options discussed in Section 3.2, we
know that response in category A and B reveals the respondents’ type.36 The observed
frequency of registrations in treatment j ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, p Aj , can be expressed as
p Aj = sa rj(A|a),
the registration frequency among A-types, rj(A|a), weighted with the share of evaders
(A-types) in the sample. Equivalently, the observed frequency of update-responses in
treatment j corresponds to
p Bj = sb rj(B|b),
the frequency of B-responses among B-types, rj(B|b), weighted with the share of these
types in the sample.
The precise type distribution is unobserved and cannot be identified from our data.
Consequently, we cannot obtain point estimates of the type-specific treatment response,
rj(A|a) and rj(B|b). Due to randomization, however, the types’ frequencies will not
systematically differ between the treatments. This is why we have implicitly assumed
saj = sa and sbj = sb for all j. Any significant differences in our observed response rates
p Aj and p
B
j must therefore reflect differences in the treatments’ impact on rj(A|a) and
rj(B|b), respectively.
The implications of the type heterogeneity for the quantitative interpretation of the
treatment differences are straightforward. The data clearly reveal that sa < 1 and sb < 1.
The comparison of p Aj (respectively p
B
j ) between treatments will therefore underestimate
the differences in the type-specific response rates. To illustrate this point, consider the
outcome of the experiment as illustrated in table 4. Comparing T1 and T2, we find
that the legal threat raises the registration rate by about one percentage point, from
p A1 = 0.0862 to p
A
2 = 0.0967. On average, however, 28 percent of the individuals identify
themselves as B-types (see table 4). It follows that sa ≤ 0.72, which implies that the
difference between rA1 and r
A
2 will be at least 1.5 percentage points (
(
p A2 − p A1
)
/0.72).
Note also that the estimations presented in sections 5 neglects sa < 1 and sb < 1. The
estimated coefficients provide lower bounds for the treatment effects on the type-specific
response.
36That is, only A-types can make an A-response (registration) and only B-types can produce a B-response
(updating of information with a verified registration ID).
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Appendix V: Details on the Manipulation Check
The manipulation check was implemented November 24–28, 2008, using the online survey
tool unipark.de. Survey participants were invited via email over the University of Inns-
bruck mailing list. To provide an incentive for participating, everybody who finished the
survey had a 1/25 chance of winning an Amazon voucher worth e 25. 4,165 individuals
clicked on the link to the survey and 3,233 completed the survey within an average of 8
minutes.
The question regarding the perceived risk of an inspection was formulated as follows:
“How large do you think is the risk – after having received this mailing [omitted for the control group
(T0)] – that the person will receive a ‘visit’ by a licensing inspector within the next 4 weeks? Please tick
a number on the scale between 0 (very unlikely) to 100 (very likely).”37
We also asked for the expected fines in case of a detection:
“Assume that the person is indeed detected by a field inspector. Which consequences do you expect? He
has to pay...
(1) no fine.
(2) a fine of less than e100.
(3) a fine of e100 – 500.
(4) a fine of e500 – 1000.
(5) a fine of e1000 – 2000.
(6) a fine of e2000 – 4000.
(7) a fine of more than e4000.”
Expectations regarding social sanctions were elicited in the following way:
“An acquaintance of the person learns that he has not payed TV license fees for the past 6 months. [in
the B-type vignette: ...that he has not informed GIS about his change in the address.] How will the
acquaintance react?
(1) will strongly approve the behavior, and support him not to register for license fees [not to update the
information].
(2) will approve the behavior.
(3) will not react at all.
(4) will disapprove the behavior.
(5) will strongly disapprove the behavior, and cool down the contact to the person.
37Note that subjects had to click on a very fine-scaled ruler to indicate this number. Hence, our data show
comparably little clustering on prominent numbers.
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Figure 1: Beliefs about TV license fee evasion
Notes: The figure plots the response distribution on beliefs about the frequency
of license fee evasion in Austria for regions with an estimated local evasion rate of
0-5%, 5-10%, 10-20%, 20-30% and above 30%. The number of observations in the
five categories is displayed in squared brackets.
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Table 1: Mailing Treatments
Standard Letter Social Information Moral Appeal
without Legal Threat
T1 T3 T5
Control Info Moral
with Legal Threat
T2 T4 T6
Threat Threat×Info Threat×Moral
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Table 2: Individual and municipality characteristics per treatment
T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Total
No-Mailing Control Threat Info Info&Threat Moral Moral&Threat
Number of Observations 2, 586 7, 984 7, 821 7, 998 8, 101 8, 084 7, 924 50, 498
Individual Characteristics: Sample Mean
Gender (% of males) 64.6 63.4 63.7 62.6 63.3 62.5 64.3 63.3
(47.8) (48.2) (48.1) (48.4) (48.2) (48.4) (47.9) (48.2)
Age (years) 36.9 36.5 36.3 36.5 36.1 36.4 36.6 36.4
(12.1) (11.8) (11.9) (11.8) (11.8) (12.1) (11.8) (11.8)
Municipality Characteristics
Population size Median 3, 954 3, 954 3, 917 3, 883 3, 917 3, 917 3, 917 3, 917
Mean 45, 815 43, 377 44, 543 43, 903 43, 319 44, 301 43, 610 43, 941
(77, 148) (75, 306) (76, 469) (76, 001) (75, 326) (75, 938) (75, 289) (75, 792)
Population density Median 134 126 128 126 126 131 126 126
(inh./km2) Mean 817 856 811 796 835 848 805 825
(2, 140) (2, 417) (2, 188) (2, 175) (2, 307) (2, 368) (2, 243) (2, 278)
Compliance rate Median 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.3 94.3 94.0 94.1 94.2
(in %) Mean 93.5 93.5 93.5 93.5 93.5 93.4 93.4 93.5
(5.8) (5.7) (5.8) (5.8) (5.7) (5.7) (5.8) (5.8)
Notes: Age is only available for a subsample of 16,281 recipients. Population density is measured as the number
of inhabitants per square kilometer. Similar to the overall rate, GIS approximates the local compliance rate
by the share of households who are registered for license fees relative to the total number of households living
in a municipality. Standard deviation is in parentheses.
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Table 3: Registrations per 25-days intervals
Registrations T0 T1–T6
days 1–25? 8 0.31% 2,794 5.83%
days 26–50? 13 0.50% 877 1.83%
days 51–75 9 0.35% 166 0.35%
days 76–100 5 0.19% 95 0.20%
Sample 2,586 47,912
Notes: Percentages are registration rates relative to the total
number of observations in T0 and T1–T6, respectively. For
intervals marked with ?, the difference in registration rates
is significant at a 1h–level.
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Table 4: Mailing Response within 50 Days
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Control Threat Info Info&Threat Moral Moral&Threat Total
Mailings sent 7,984 7,821 7,998 8,101 8,084 7,924 47,912
Non-Deliverable 1,126 14.10% 1,127 14.41% 1,173 14.67% 1,141 14.08% 1,164 14.40% 1,174 14.82% 6,905 14.41%
Mailings delivered 6,858 6,694 6,825 6,960 6,920 6,750 41,007
A. Registrations 591 8.62% 647 9.67% 562 8.23% 675 9.70% 567 8.19% 629 9.32% 3,671 8.95%
B. Updates 1,998 29.13% 1,991 29.74% 1,875 27.47% 1,938 27.84% 1,790 25.87% 1,908 28.27% 11,500 28.04%
C. No Equipment 172 2.51% 203 3.03% 162 2.37% 179 2.57% 163 2.36% 179 2.65% 1,058 2.58%
D. Unclassified 194 2.83% 172 2.57% 179 2.62% 185 2.66% 166 2.40% 174 2.58% 1,070 2.61%
Overall Response 2,955 43.09% 3,013 45.01% 2,778 40.70% 2,977 42.77% 2,686 38.82% 2,890 42.81% 17,299 42.19%
Notes: Percentage of non-delivered mailings relative to the total number of mailings. Percentages for (A–D
and overall) response rates are relative to the number of delivered mailings.
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Table 5: Treatment effects on registrations (A-responses)
Dependent variable: Registrations (within 50 days)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Mailing 0.065??? 0.065??? 0.066??? 0.066???
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Threat 0.010??? 0.011??? 0.009??? 0.009?? 0.012??? 0.013??? 0.011??? 0.010??
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Moral −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Info −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Threat × Moral −0.002 0.001 −0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Threat × Info 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 0.008??? 0.008??? 0.008??? 0.008??? 0.085??? 0.085??? 0.086??? 0.086???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 50,498 50,498 50,498 50,498 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007
Notes: All specifications are estimated with a linear probability model. (I)–(IV) are based on the full sample,
(V)–(VIII) drop the no-mailing sample and observations where a mailing was not delivered. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ??? and ?? indicate significance at a 1% and 5%-level, respectively.
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Table 6: Treatment effects on contract updates (B-responses)
Dependent variable: Update responses (within 50 days)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Threat 0.011?? 0.005 0.015??? 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Moral −0.024??? −0.033??? −0.024??? −0.033???
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Info −0.018??? −0.018??? −0.012? −0.017??
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Threat × Moral 0.019?? 0.018
(0.009) (0.011)
Threat × Info −0.011 −0.002
(0.009) (0.011)
Constant 0.289??? 0.287??? 0.292??? 0.291???
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007
Notes: All specifications are estimated with a linear probability
model. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??, ?
indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
48
Table 7: Treatment effects on registrations: local evasion
Dependent variable: Registrations (within 50 days)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Threat 0.014??? 0.013??? 0.013??? 0.012???
(β1) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Moral −0.009?? −0.007 −0.009?? −0.006
(β2) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Info −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.005
(β3) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Threat × EvasionQ1 −0.004 −0.004
(γ1) (0.006) (0.006)
Moral × EvasionQ1 0.012 0.011
(γ2) (0.007) (0.007)
Info × EvasionQ1 0.014? 0.012?
(γ3) (0.007) (0.007)
EvasionQ1 0.011?
(γ0) (0.006)
Threat × EvasionT1 −0.004 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Moral × EvasionT1 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Info × EvasionT1 0.013? 0.012?
(0.007) (0.007)
EvasionT1 0.010
(0.006)
Municipality Controls (MC )
or Dummies (FE ) MC FE MC FE
Observations 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007
Notes: All specifications are estimated with linear probability models and
include a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??,
? indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
49
Table 8: Treatment interactions with municipality characteristics
Dependent variable: Registrations (within 50 days)
Interactions Population Size High Pop.Density High Income Share of Right Voters
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Threat 0.008??? 0.007?? 0.008?? 0.006? 0.009??? 0.008?? 0.042??? 0.042???
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013)
Moral −0.008?? −0.005 −0.009?? −0.006 −0.006 −0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016)
Info −0.002 −0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.002 −0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016)
Threat × PopSize 0.009?? 0.010??
(0.004) (0.004)
Moral × PopSize 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Info × PopSize −0.000 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
PopSize −0.022???
(0.008)
Threat × PopDensQ1 0.018??? 0.020???
(0.007) (0.007)
Moral × PopDensQ1 0.015? 0.011
(0.008) (0.009)
Info × PopDensQ1 −0.001 −0.004
(0.008) (0.008)
PopDensQ1 −0.016
(0.010)
Threat × IncomeQ1 0.010 0.012?
(0.007) (0.007)
Moral × IncomeQ1 0.002 −0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
Info × IncomeQ1 0.000 −0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
IncomeQ1 0.000
(0.013)
Threat × RightVoters −0.049??? −0.051???
(0.019) (0.019)
Moral × RightVoters −0.011 −0.005
(0.023) (0.023)
Info × RightVoters −0.013 −0.010
(0.023) (0.023)
RightVoters −0.018
(0.037)
Municipality Controls (MC )
or Dummies (FE ) MC FE MC FE MC FE MC FE
Observations 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007 41,007
Notes: All specifications are estimated with a linear probability model and include a constant term. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??, ? indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively. PopSize
measures the population in 1,000 inhabitants; PopDensQ1 and IncomeQ1 are dummies for municipalities in
the top quartile of the population density and the gross average incomes, respectively; RightVoters is the
share of votes casted to rightist parties (Volkspartei, Freiheitliche and Bu¨ndnis Zukunft O¨sterreich) in the 2006
parliamentary elections.
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Table 9: Survey results: Treatment effects on risk perceptions
Dependent variable:
Expected inspection risk
(I) (II)
Mailing 22.923??? 24.333???
(2.179) (2.183)
Mailing × Threat 2.921??? 3.193???
(1.104) (1.107)
Mailing × Moral 0.768 −0.056
(1.332) (1.338)
Mailing × Info −0.306 −1.064
(1.360) (1.362)
A-type 0.673 0.862
(1.103) (1.104)
Constant 38.388??? 56.801???
(2.106) (5.354)
Additional control No Yes
Observations 3,213 3,098
Notes: Results from OLS regressions with robust standard
errors in parentheses. ??? indicates significance at a 1%-
level.
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